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The U.K. Courts, the Common Law
Approach and the Application of E.C. Law
Gunnar Beck*
I. Introduction
Upon accession to the European Community ("EC"), the English
courts acquired the power to apply EC law. This article focuses on the
extent to which the distinct features of the common law and its systems
of precedent, approaches to statutory interpretation and the need for
political sensitivity in judicial decision-making have facilitated and/or
hampered the application of EC law by the domestic courts. It concludes
that, in broad terms, the domestic courts have not systematically used
their powers to subvert the application of EC law, and the reception in
the UK courts offers a good example of the politically sensitive type of
judicial law-making which F.A. Hayek thought paradigmatic of the
common law.' At the same time, while judicial discretion so far seems to
have facilitated the application of EC law-generally by harmonious
interpretation of potentially offending legislation and, in extremis, by the
disapplication of either statutes or statutory instruments-the application
of EC law has itself favored the judicialization of legislation in the UK.
Finally, while for the most part judges have found it in their interest to
give effect to EC law in the domestic legal order, the precise manner in
which EC law must be applied is also determined by the domestic courts,
which could lead to the undermining of the effectiveness of EC law in
* Dr. Gunnar Beck is a lecturer in law at the School of Oriental and African
Studies, University of London, and a parliamentary legal adviser to the European
Scrutiny Committee of the House of Commons, London. He specializes in EU law, legal
theory and constitutional and human rights law. His forthcoming and recent publications
include: Immanuel Kant's Theory of Rights, RATIO JURIS (forthcoming 2006); The
Problem of Kompetenz-Kompetenz: A Conflict Between Right and Right, in Which There
Can Be No Praetor, 30(1) EUR. L. REv. 42 (2005); The British Parliament and the
Convention on the Future of Europe, 30(5) EUR. L. REV. 743 (2005); Dresden und das
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the domestic legal order. Section III of this article will focus on the
various ways in which the UK courts have used their discretion to that
effect. Finally, the article concludes that in large measure, the avenues
for the exercise of judicial law-making in the application of EC law are
the same as in domestic law, the twin powers over the application of
judicial precedent and of the interpretation of legislation.
II. U.K. Courts and the Common Law
Lord Goff, one of Britain's most pre-eminent and learned Law
Lords in recent times once commented: "The layman thinks of the law
as inherently predictable, clear, precise, certain, even rock-like in quality.
It is in fact nothing of the sort.",2 It may be more than a merely incidental
difference in style between English and U.S. judges that Lord Goff did
not go on to conclude, as O.W. Holmes famously did, that the Law is
what the judge says it is (because the doctrine of precedent is largely a
myth and even words and concepts in statutory law require
interpretation). 3  But judicial discretion also rests on judicial self-
restraint. For in any conflict between what the judge says and what the
lawmaker legislates, what the law is will depend on what the official
enforces. Law is about power and who has the final say; who has the
final say also determines the legal reasoning.
Legal reasoning under the common law has at least two meanings.
In one sense, it refers to what judges say, not what they do. Even if their
decisions are value judgments, judges dress them up as reasons. Legal
reasoning in this sense refers to the rhetoric and specialist jargon with
which the courts present their judgments. In another sense, legal
reasoning is no different from practical reasoning in everyday life.
Impartiality is not a fact of human life-judges, the great American
judge Benjamin Cardozo said, are supposed to transcend the emotional
imperfections of ordinary human but in fact remain subject to human
limitations.4 They decide, just like everyone else, based on a variety of
factors, including: professionalism, personal conviction, concern for the
public interest, fear, individual self-interest and professional self-interest.
No matter how these factors weigh upon each decision, judges generally
seek to present the reasons for their decisions in the language of
impartiality and universal validity. Judges and lawyers feel the need to
give reasons for their actions, subject to one major constraint: they are
constrained by the need to justify their decision in terms of the
2. Lord Goff, Judge, Jurist and Legislature, 3 Denning L.J. 79, 79 (1987).
3. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law After One Hundred Years, 110
HARV. L. REv. 991, 994 (1997).
4. BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 168 (1921).
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formalized language of the law. Legal reasoning is ordinary thinking in
extraordinary language.
The vast majority of cases never reach this state; they do not raise
questions of law but rather are concerned with the determination of facts
and the evaluation of evidence from which they are deduced. For
example, the judge may need to decide upon the credibility of witnesses,
evaluate conflicting medical reports, and determine whether someone is
telling the truth. This is simply what the law calls judicial fact-finding.
However, the fault with judicial fact-finding is that its results do not
usually find its way into the law reports. Worse, if a trial court
mistakenly accepts as true the oral testimony of an honest but inaccurate
witness or even a lying witness, seldom can an upper court detect this
mistake; it usually adopts the facts as found by the trial court and does so
because the trial court saw and heard the witnesses testify. So what I
talked about in terms of uncertainty in the determination of the rules to
be applied to facts is really only the tip of the iceberg, just as six-
sevenths of an iceberg is located below water, six-sevenths of the
uncertainty of the law is fact-uncertainty, which never reaches the law
reports and hardly ever concerns the legal academic.
What does this tell us about the common law? First, judicial
decisions often lack certainty. This is unavoidable for many reasons.
Sometimes legal rules are lacking, and in difficult cases, judges lack the
guidance of precedent. Contrary to Dworkin's view,5 there is no clear
hierarchy of principles that tells judges how to decide in these cases.
Different judges will inevitably decide differently. This is amply
demonstrated by thousands of appeal cases where the appellate court
judges did not decide unanimously. Whether there is, as Dworkin
maintains, a right legal answer independent of the actual answer reached
by judges,6 is neither here nor there since it is epistemologically
inaccessible. Moreover, the doctrine of precedent is not what it is
promised to be: whether a precedent exists is always a matter of
interpretation. In most cases, judges can distinguish cases if they do not
like their outcome. Furthermore, often even the "ratio of a case" 7 is
unclear, and the ratio of a case may even evolve over time. What decides
the ratio of a case is not the judge laying it down but how subsequent
judges see it in light of subsequent cases.
Second, the idea that judges simply apply the law is a myth. The
common law, and even the application of statutes, is judge-made law. It
5. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
6. See id.
7. "Ratio of the case" is the equivalent to the American legal term "holding."
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is what Bentham called the product of Judge and Co., 8 by which he
meant it is the product not only of individual judges but above all of the
state of professional legal opinion which influences their individual
judgments. Law in this sense has an element of retrospectivity.
Bentham gives the example of the way a man makes law for his dog; he
waits until it does something he disapproves of and then beats it and
thereby teaches it that what it did was wrong.9
Third, judges are not wholly unconstrained, and their decisions may
entail costs not only to others but, in a more limited professional sense,
to themselves. Judges do not like being overruled. To some extent, the
lower court decisions anticipate what the Court of Appeal and House of
Lords will think.
Finally, the law is ineliminably uncertain but not wholly
unpredictable. Good lawyers have a better record of correctly predicting
judicial outcomes. Therefore, there must exist better and worse
reasoning in lawyers. However, what is meant by reasoning here is not
legal reasoning as an autonomous and specifically legal way of
reasoning. Rather, it is a good knowledge of the relevant law combined
with an appreciation of the economic and political context in which
judges make their decisions. Often, however, the political and social
views of judges-both collectively and even individually-are held in
check by their fear of being overruled. Fear of correction thus restrains
judicial discretion just as much as such discretion rests on judicial self-
restraint where cases are politically sensitive and all too obvious judicial
law-making would lead judges into conflicts with the political authorities
where the latter are unlikely to back down.
What is the relevance of the foregoing discussion for the application
of Community law1° in the common law jurisdiction of the United
Kingdom? Judicial discretion appears to have favored rather than
hampered the application of EC law. The reason for this, however, is
contingent rather than inherent in the judicial discretion enjoyed by
common law judges. They exercise their discretion essentially with the
acquiescence of the political authorities; should the political climate
change dramatically, it is by no means clear that judicial attitudes would
remain as faithful to the purpose of EC legislation and judicial
prescriptions of the European Court of Justice ("ECJ"). The discretion of
the domestic courts has by and large resulted in the faithful application of
8. Jeremy Bentham, Letters to Lord Greenville on the Proposed Reform in the
Administration of Civil Justice in Scotland, in 5 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 5-8
(John Bowring ed., 1962).
9. 5 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 235 (John Bowring ed., 1962).
10. Community law includes treaty obligations, directives, regulations and decisions.
The term EC law may be used interchangeably.
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Community law. And when it comes to fact-finding the one feature of
the litigation process in the common law is the overwhelming amount of
paper thrown up by its extensive rules of disclosure. Buried deep within
countless files lies the ultimate answer to the question of how the
domestic courts have applied Community law.
III. Community Law Within a Common Law Framework
According to the Community law doctrine of the supremacy, all
directly effective Community law automatically takes precedence over
national law including national constitutional law.1 Community law
does not have direct effect when the obligations imposed are
insufficiently precise or the measure is not intended to confer rights on
individuals. Subject to qualifications, the principle of supremacy applies
not only to the provisions of the Treaties on which the European
Community is founded but also to secondary legislation12 and the case
law of the European Court of Justice. Under the principle of loyal
cooperation set out in general terms in Article 10 EC Treaty,' 3 national
courts are under a duty to apply Community law, including the case law
of the ECJ. However, like the European Commission which lacks the
resources to administer and enforce its own policies and largely relies on
national administrations for this purpose, the European Court of Justice
relies on the resources and cooperation of national courts for the
application and enforcement of EC law. Except in the very restricted
circumstances laid down in Article 230(4) EC Treaty, 14 individuals
cannot institute proceedings directly before the ECJ. Rather, they need
to bring their action in the national courts, which may then refer
questions of EC law to the ECJ under the preliminary rulings procedure
of Article 234 of the EC Treaty.15  The application of EC law
necessitates the cooperation of national judiciaries. National courts are
asked not only to decide whether a point of Community law has already
been decided by the ECJ, but also whether the law is sufficiently clear so
as to require no ruling from the ECJ. In the first case they are asked to
refer, in the latter, they are asked either to interpret and apply existing
precedents or to interpret the allegedly uncontentious legislation. Once a
national court has decided not to refer an issue of EC law, private
litigants generally have no means of forcing it to reconsider its ruling
11. Case C-11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und
Vorratsstelle ftir Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125.
12. Secondary legislation includes EC regulations, directives and decisions.
13. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340)
3 [hereinafter EC Treaty].
14. EC Treaty art. 230(4).
15. EC Treaty art. 234.
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except by persuading an appeals court to make a reference.
By the time the United Kingdom joined the European Community
in 1972, the doctrines of direct effect and of the supremacy of European
Community were well established. Being that the United Kingdom is a
dualistic country, where international obligations entered into by the
government have to be given effect through an Act of Parliament before
they can be enforced in the domestic courts, EC law was incorporated
into national law by the European Communities Act 1972,16 which also
allowed the courts to give effect to the principles of supremacy and direct
effect. Section 3(1) of the 1972 Act requires the UK courts to follow the
case law of the ECJ on any question of EC law, namely, to follow
precedents of the ECJ where they apply and to refer any other question to
the ECJ for determination.17 Section 2(4) states that any statute and other
domestic legislation is to be interpreted in accordance with EC law as
laid down in the Treaty, legislation adopted under it by the EC
institutions and in the case law of the ECJ. 18 By requiring the English
courts to take judicial notice of the decisions of the ECJ, the 1972 Act in
effect allowed for the incorporation of judicially created principles, such
as the doctrine of supremacy, into the domestic legal order.
The English courts thus see EC law through the filter of the 1972
Act. The dual uncertainty arising in the English legal system from the
interpretation of legal texts and from the application of judicial
precedents might have augured ill for the faithful application of EC
legislation in conformity with the jurisprudence of the European Court of
Justice, all the more given the relative lack of familiarity of British
judges with the substance and reasoning of European Community law.
However, the common law has not hampered the application of EC law
through the domestic court system.19 There are at least three reasons for
this.
First, one obvious reason is the absence of a written constitution in
the United Kingdom, which left the English courts free from the
constraints of a written constitutional document as a national
Grundnorm. It also gave the courts a large measure of flexibility to
interpret domestic legislation to be in harmony with potentially
conflicting EC law. In important respects, the common law tradition of
judicial discretion seems to have favored rather than undermined the
16. European Communities Act 1972, c. 68 (U.K.).
17. Id. § 3(1).
18. Id. § 2(4).
19. This is the standard view shared by practically all the commentators. See, e.g.,
Carl Otto Lenz & Gerhard Grill, The Preliminary Ruling Procedure and the United




application of European law. The exercise of discretion in the
application of EC law ultimately rests on the need to avoid open conflict
with the political authorities able to enforce their will. Had the political
authorities been less acquiescent in the judicial approach giving effect to
the supremacy of EC law, the political scope for the exercise of judicial
discretion would have diminished rapidly. Ultimately, the absence of
legal constraints on the exercise of judicial discretion in the common law
only translates into effective judicial power within the confines set by the
need to respect political power where the latter is likely to enforce its
will.
Second, the degree to which the UK courts have facilitated the
application of EC law-through harmonious interpretation of potentially
conflicting legislation and, in extremis, through the disapplication of
either statutes or statutory instruments-becomes less surprising if it is
borne in mind that the application of EC law has itself favored the
judicialization of legislation in the UK. Beginning with the landmark
cases of Shields v Coomes2° and Macarthys v Smith,21 the UK courts
have resolved any ambiguity or inconsistency with EC law in national
statutes by giving primacy to EC law. The adoption of a purposive
approach as part of the canon of statutory interpretation for the purposes
of the application of EC law, subsequently emboldened the courts in their
strongly teleological and at times highly strained construction of primary
and secondary legislation to ensure compliance with the Human Rights
Act.
22
Third, the particular manner in which the EC Treaty provided for
the application of EC law through the domestic courts, and in particular,
the preliminary reference procedure, left the English courts with great
flexibility over important aspects of the implementation of EC law. The
remainder of this article will focus on the various ways in which the
domestic courts have used their discretion to undermine or, at least, to
influence this implementation. The subsequent discussion will focus on
the judicial application of the doctrine of acte clair and the precedental
effect of the case law of the European Court of Justice, together with the
national prerogative over procedural and jurisdictional rules with regard
to all national litigation involving points of EC law. Other potential
sources of legal uncertainty will be mentioned less for reasons of
completeness but as pointers for further and more detailed examination.
20. Shields v. E. Coomes (Holdings) Ltd., (1978) 1 W.L.R. 1408.
21. Macarthys Ltd. v. Smith Note, (1979) 1 W.L.R. 1189.
22. Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42 (U.K.).
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A. Acte Clair
Article 234 of the EC Treaty is designed to be used only if there is a
question to be answered which falls into one of the categories mentioned
in Article 234(1).23 National courts need not refer a question of EC law
in a number of circumstances, the most obvious being where they feel
that the answer to the issue is so clear that no reference to the ECJ is
warranted. This is known as the acte clair doctrine. The conditions in
which it is legitimate for a national court to refuse to make a reference
24for this reason were set out by the ECJ in its 1982 CILFIT judgment.
In this case, the Court ruled that the acte clair doctrine applied in
circumstances where no precedent of the ECJ existed on the point in
question. The Court also made plain that the acte clair doctrine has a
very limited scope of application. It pointed out that a ruling from the
European Court of Justice was only superfluous if the national judge-
who had to consider all the different language versions of the relevant
provision and both its context and objective-came to the conclusion that
neither for him, nor for courts in other Member States, nor for the
European Court itself, could there be a serious doubt as to the
interpretation of the relevant provision.26 In theory, the test laid down by
the Court sets a tall order indeed. In practice, however, the almost
insurmountable difficulties a national court would face in carrying out
the required test have led national courts largely to ignore the very strict
guidance offered by the ECJ.
One commentator predicted that the effect of CILFIT would be to
encourage national courts to decide EC law points for themselves.
27
Reviewing the relevant post-CILFIT English case law through the 1980s,
Prof. Arnull later concluded that his fears had been borne out, especially
by the English courts.28 The English cases in which the CILFIT decision
23. EC Treaty art. 234(1). The article reads:
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings
concerning:
(1) the interpretation of this Treaty;
(2) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the
Community and the ECB;
(3) the interpretation of statutes of bodies established by an act of the
Council,where those statutes so provide.




27. Anthony Arnull, Reflections on Judicial Attitudes at the European Court, 34
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 168, 172 (1985).




was mentioned suggested that the judgment had been used by the
domestic courts to justify refusing to make a reference where the national
court had formed a view as to how the points of Community law in issue
should be resolved. 29  Throughout the 1980s, courts in the United
Kingdom made far fewer references than courts in other Member States
of comparable size.30 More recent studies show that the UK courts
continue to remain markedly more opposed to refer questions as to the
interpretation of Community law to the ECJ than those in other Members
States. Between 1992 and 2002, UK courts referred 217 cases to the
ECJ.3 1 This compares with 481 references from the Italian courts, 586
from German courts and 188 from the Belgian courts, and 209 from
Dutch courts. The most recent figures for 2003 and 2004 confirm this
trend: in both years taken together the UK courts referred forty-four
cases to the ECJ compared to ninety-three from Italy, ninety-three from
Germany, fifty-six from the Dutch courts, and forty-two from Belgium.
33
British courts referred roughly the same number of cases as two
countries with each about one quarter of Britain's population, less than
half than the courts in Italy, which has about the same population, and
only slightly more than a third than the courts in Germany whose
population is slightly larger. In absolute times, the UK courts referred
fewer cases than Austria, a country with one-fifth of Britain's population,
which was not even a Member State for three out of the eleven years.
Proportionate to population size, the British courts referred fewer cases
in virtually any year than any other EU Member State with the possible
exception of Spain. In contrast to their Continental counterparts, at least
in the original Member States, the English judges have generally had no
formal training in EC law and are reliant, to a much greater extent, on the
legal knowledge of counsel who likewise, with the exception of a few
specialist barristers, are likely to have had little or no training in
Community law. EC law only become a compulsory subject for UK law
students in the mid-1990s. This may help to explain the greater
reluctance of UK courts to make references. Such reluctance would be
29. Id. at 637.
30. Id.
31. Requests by national courts for preliminary rulings are recorded at the Court of
Justice Registry and are published in full in the Official Journal of the European
Communities. The cited figures are based on a table compiled from these records for
1992-2002 contained in Annex VI of the ECJ's report entitled "Application of
Community Law by the National Courts: A Survey," available at
http://curia.eu.int/en/coopju/apercu-reflets/lang/index.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
32. Id.
33. The statistics for 2003 and 2004 can be found in the annual reports of the ECJ
for both years available at http://curia.eu.int/en/instit/presentationfr/rapport/
stat/stO4cr.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
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justifiable, however, only if UK judges were somehow more competent
to decide points of Community than their Continental judicial colleagues.
How plausible such a justification might be, is best left for the reader to
surmise. Suffice it to say that the following cases both in this and the
subsequent section suggest a rather pessimistic reading.
In Francovich34 and Brasserie du Pcheur,35 the ECJ established the
principle of Member State liability in damages for breaches of
Community law, including breaches of directives that are not directly
effective against private individuals. The ECJ laid down that, in addition
to other conditions, a breach could be established only if the relevant
Community rule of law was intended to confer rights on individuals.36
One of the very first cases involving a claim for damages for breach of
Community law coming before the UK courts was the Three Rivers
District Case37 in which depositors in BCCI, a bank that had been placed
in liquidation, sued the Bank of England for damages for lack of
supervision of BCCI in breach of the First Banking Directive 77/780.38
The High Court held that the directive did not impose a supervisory duty
capable of grounding a damages claim for breach of Community law.
39
Assessing the first condition of state liability-the conferral of rights
upon individuals-the Court found that the First Banking Directive
constituted a first step toward harmonization but did not confer rights on
savers or other creditors nor a right of action in damages against the
supervising authority, which precluded the plaintiffs from relying upon
Francovich liability.40 The ruling, to the effect that the directive did not
confer rights on individuals vis-a-vis the supervisory body, was affirmed
by the majority of the Court of Appeal as well as by the House of
Lords.4  The House of Lords regarded the matter of depositors' rights
under Francovich liability as an acte clair, which obviated the need for a
reference for a preliminary ruling.42 In Francovich, the ECJ had held the
Italian state liable for failure to take effective steps to guarantee payment
of wages of employees in the event of their employer's insolvency
subject to the conditions of Directive 80/987. 43 In the absence of any
34. Case C-6/90, Francovich & Bonifaci v. Italy, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357.
35. Case C-46/93, Brasserie du Pecheur SA v. Germany, 1996 E.C.R. 1-1029.
36. Francovich, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357, T 3.
37. Three Rivers Dist. Council v. Bank of England, (2003) 2 A.C. 1 (H.L. 2000)




41. See Three Rivers Dist. Council v. Bank of England, (2000) 2 W.L.R. 15 (C.A.
1998).
42. Three Rivers Dist. Council v. Bank of England, (2003) 2 A.C. 1 (H.L. 2000)
(appeal taken from C.A.).
43. See Francovich, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357.
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ECJ ruling excluding depositors' rights from amongst the actionable
rights in Community law, the House of Lords nonetheless took such an
exclusionary intent to be self-evident.
According to Francovich, the only bases for excluding rights from
amongst actionable damages claims are either that the content of those
rights cannot be clearly identified from the text of the directive or that
there is evidence that the directive was not intended to confer rights on
individuals. 4  In Three Rivers, Lord Hope, in his leading judgment,
made much of the fact that nowhere in the Directive was there to be
found any definition of any expression referring to individuals in whose
favor rights might be said to have been intended to be created by the
Directive. 5 If the result to be achieved was to entail the granting of
rights to individuals such as savers or depositors, Lord Hope opined, then
one would have expected a definition of the intended rights-bearers such
as those included in a number of EC consumer and environmental
protection directives. 46 However, Lord Hope fails to address two key
issues: (1) whether the employees' protection directive in Francovich
had gone further in defining the intended rights-bearers, and (2) how this
was not merely a first step towards harmonization, in which the First
Banking Directive was held to be. In Francovich, the relevant Directive,
which imposed clearly defined duties on emanations of the state, did not
then go on to define the recipients beyond the generic term
"employees. 47 Applying the criteria to Three Rivers, its directive also
should have been construed as a harmonizing measure. In truth, both
directives impose clearly defined duties, which may reasonably be
construed to imply a right to enforce these duties provided the text does
not expressly exclude such enforceability. In Norbrook Laboratories v.
MAFF,5 the ECJ made clear that the intention to confer individual rights
could be inferred if the directive clearly and exhaustively laid down
correlative duties.49 Moreover, in Francovich, the ECJ even found the
requisite intention in circumstances where some of provisions of the
directive lacked sufficient precision to be directly effective. 50 Therefore,
it appears that the rights laid down in the First Banking Directive are not
obviously less clearly defined than those held to be actionable grounds in
Francovich or some of the later cases where the ECJ imposed
44. See id ff 66, 72.
45. Three Rivers, (2003) 2 A.C. 1, 219.
46. Id.
47. See generally Council Directive 80/987, 1980 O.J. (L 283) (EC) (relating to the
protection of "employees" in the event of the insolvency of their employer).
48. Case C-127/95, Norbrook Labs. v. Ministry of Agric., Fisheries & Food, 1998
E.C.R. 1-1531.
49. /d 107-12.
50. See Francovich, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357, 56-68.
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Francovich liability-the principal difference consisting solely in the
different classes of rights-bearers. This was the view of the Court of
Appeal's Lord Justice Auld whose dissenting judgment expressed the
view that the First Banking Directive did impose clearly defined
obligations on both Member States and supervisory bodies, giving rise to
Community law-based rights in damages for the benefit of depositors.5
Lord Justice Auld's intellectually powerful dissenting judgment
draws attention to the curious phenomenon of a category of UK cases
where a unanimous or majority House of Lords rules a matter acte clair
in circumstances despite a leading Law Lord or dissenting Court of
Appeal delivered an alternative answer and favored a reference to the
ECJ on the point in issue. Perhaps the most striking example of such
judicial self-confidence in its own omnicomptence is Lord Slynn's
leading opinion in the case of Optident Limited v. Secretary of State For
Trade and Industry.52 Their Lordships held unanimously that a tooth
bleaching product with other alleged medical qualities was a cosmetic
product for the purposes of Council Directive 76/768/EEC. 53 By Lord
Slynn's own admission, their Lordships reached their conclusion by
reversing the unanimous opposite view of the Court of Appeal which
would have normally been the court of last instance.54 Additionally, their
Lordships opinion went against the view of the European Commission,
as well as judicial decisions in both Germany and Sweden.5 5 It can only
be concluded that "clear" to their Lordships means "clear to them" and
no one else.
A similarly solipsistic tendency is manifest in the very recent
decision of the House of Lords (sitting on appeal from the Inner House
of the Court of Session in Scotland) in Percy v. Church of Scotland
Board of National Mission.5 6 Percy was a female associate Minister of
the Church of Scotland who was accused of having an affair with a
married elder of the combined parish in which she exercised her
ministry. In the course of the Church's investigations into the charges
brought against her, she resigned her position in the Church, thus
bringing the investigation to an end. The Court was faced with three
questions: (1) Was she employed under a contract of employment-all
were agreed that she was not (including Percy herself); (2) Was she
51. Three Rivers Dist. Council v. Bank of England, (2000) 2 W.L.R. 15 (C.A. 1998)
(Auld, L.J., dissenting).




56. See Percy v. Church of Scotland, [2005] UKHL 73.
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protected by section 6 of the Sex Discrimination Act 197557 and/or by
the Equal Treatment Directive58 from unlawful discrimination consisting
of exercising in her case a more severe discipline than the Church was
accustomed to exercise in the case of a male Minister who is charged
with having an affair with a married parishioner; and (3) If she was so
protected, how was the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975 to be reconciled
with Church of Scotland Act 192159 which recognises that Church's
exclusive jurisdiction in matters of discipline?
With regard to the main issue of the second question, Lord Hoffman
differed from Lord Hope. The other judges did not address cursorily this
question. Lord Hoffman held that Percy held an office and so was not
employed under a contract of service or a contract personally to execute
any work or labor.60  Consequently she fell outside the scope of the
Equal Treatment Directive. Lord Hope held that she was a "worker" for
the purposes of EC law, therefore, she fell within the scope of the
Directive.61 The point mattered because, whatever the proper priority as
between the 1921 Act and the 1975 Act, the Directive clearly trumps the
former. The Church sought a reference which Lord Hope regarded as
inappropriate since "the matter at issue in this case is acte claire" (sic).
62
How a matter can be acte clair when a fellow judge in the highest appeal
court in the land takes the opposite view is far from obvious. Perhaps it
suggests that Lord Hope takes a decidedly dim view of Lord Hoffman's
judicial qualities.
The vexed issue of who is and is not a worker under Community
law also concerned Justice Moses in the case of the Queen on the
application of Finian Manson v. Ministry of Defence.63  What is
remarkable in this case, however, is not so much the actual decision
reached by Justice Moses but the reasoning whereby he reached his
conclusions and more particularly his reasons for refusing to make a
reference to the ECJ. In his judgment, his Lordship not only admitted his
abiding doubts about his own conclusions on the issue of the
justiciability of the relevant EC directive in the national courts (known as
direct effect in Community law); he also conceded that if this meant that
he should have referred the issue to the ECJ for this and possible other
reasons, he would have refused to do so on the grounds that "the delay in
57. Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, c. 65, § 82(1).
58. Council Directive 76/207, 1976 O.J. (L 39) 40 (EC).
59. Church of Scotland Act, 1921, 11 & 12 Geo. 5, c. 29, § 3, sched. art. IV.
60. Percy v. Church of Scotland, [2005] UKHL 73, 66 (Hoffman, L.).
61. Id. 127 (Hope, L.)
62. Id. 135 (Hope, L.).
63. The Queen on the Application of Finian Manson v. Ministry of Defence, [2005]
EWHC 427 (Admin) CO/4831/2002.
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this case is already so great that it would be wrong to add to it so
substantially by a reference." 64 In the English legal system, which is
more expensive and more prone to delays than any other with the
probable exception of the U.S., the need to limit costs and delays is likely
the most common reason for judges to refuse to exercise their discretion
not to impose time bars, no less than for making references to the ECJ on
issues of Community on which they have no competence to reach a
judicial conclusion. The CILFIT criteria laid down by the ECJ leaves no
doubt that ostensible concern to avoid delay and unnecessary costs under
no circumstances justify a refusal to refer, and it is the responsibility of
domestic courts to ensure that appropriate interim measures are adopted.
On occasion, failure to refer may avoid purposeless hardship, as almost
any departure from any rule occasionally does. Yet, it appears that more
than twenty years after CILFIT many English judges remain as wise as to
when they should and should not refer as they were on the day of British
accession thirty years ago.
However, not even the above cases and considerations can account
for the significant and consistent discrepancy in the number of referrals
by the UK courts compared to those from national courts in other
Member States. Often, the courts do not justify such decisions expressis
verbis as "acte clair." In other words, while some glaring examples of
judicial misapplication of EC law can be excavated from the hundreds of
yards of law reports that have been added to law libraries since the UK
joined the Community, most instances of misapplication either will not
have been reported at all or make no mention of Community. For in the
English courts, judges still largely rely on counsel for either party to
draw the relevant law to the attention of the judge, who is generally a
non-specialist. If counsel does not, the odds are the judge will take no
cognizance of the point. Additionally, if neither party asks for a
reference, none will be made.65 Far more cases will have been decided
where a reference was not made when it should have been compared to
situations where a reference was considered but found otiose or
inappropriate. Finally, contrary to the artificial distinction drawn in the
CILFIT judgment between issues that are acte clair and those covered by
an ECJ precedent, there are many cases where either both elements are
64. Id.f 75.
65. Chalmers emphasizes the more reactive position of judges in civil trials in the
context of the British legal doctrine on the reference procedure. This perceives the
question of reference, despite being a matter of judicial discretion, as essentially one for
the parties. A court will not refer of its own motion, but only if asked by one of the
parties, and will always refer if both parties agree on the need for a reference. Damian
Chalmers, The Much Ado about Judicial Politics in the United Kingdom: A Statistical
Analysis of Reported Decisions of United Kingdom Courts Invoking EU Law 1973-1998
§ VIII (Jean Monnet Working Papers, 1, 2000).
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involved or where the failure to refer can be characterized either as a
failure by the domestic court to apply the relevant ECJ case law or as a
substitution of its own erroneous reasoning for that of the European
Court. Both scenarios are illustrated by the cases in the next section,
which could be presented either as misapplications of binding precedents
or as failures to refer.
B. Precedent
The second principal ground on which national courts may decline
reference to the ECJ includes cases where precedent stems from a prior
ECJ decision. In CILFIT, the ECJ clarified the effect of its precedent on
national courts. According to CILFIT, national courts may rely upon
ECJ precedent even if the prior decision did not emerge from the same
type of proceedings, and even though the questions at issue were not
strictly identical, provided that the substance of the legal point has
already been adjudicated in a prior ECJ decision, thereby obviating the
need for a reference. 66 In substance, the guidance provided by the ECJ
regarding the application of its decisions to later cases raises the same
fundamental problem characterizing the application of the doctrine of
precedent in the English common law: when is the legal issue in any
given case sufficiently similar to that in a prior decision of the ECJ for
that decision to be legitimately applied as a precedent in the later case
before a lower court. As the following cases suggest, due to the inherent
uncertainty in the application of any precedent, the English courts have
been able to exploit their discretion to subvert the application of ECJ
precedents almost as effectively as their manipulation of inconvenient
precedents in domestic law.
Rutherford v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (No2),67 and
Home Office v. Bailey & Ors68 provide a particularly striking example of
the suspension of a binding ECJ precedent in English courts. In
Rutherford, the claimants sought to nullify certain sections of the UK
Employment Rights Act 199669 on the grounds that the upper age limit
for unfair dismissal, which prevented anyone older than sixty-five from
seeking compensation, was indirectly sex discriminatory on the grounds
that it affected many more men than women as men formed most of the
working population over sixty-five. 70 The Court of Appeal upheld the
66. Case 283/81, Srl CILFIT & Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v. Ministry of Health,
1982 E.C.R. 3415.
67. Rutherford v. Sec'y of State for Trade and Indus. (No2), [2004] EWCA (Civ)
1186 (Eng.).
68. Home Office v. Bailey, [2005] EWCA (Civ) 327 (Eng.).
69. UK Employment Rights Act, 1996, c. 18.
70. Rutherford, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1186.
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decision of the Employment Appeal Tribunal which had overturned a
judgment at first instance in favor of the claimants. The first instance
tribunal had held the measure to be sex discriminatory with reference
solely to the disadvantaged group of those employed and over sixty-five
who were liable to dismissal without compensation together with that
group of the workforce between fifty-five and sixty-five for whom
retirement was a realistic prospect. Within the total composed of these
two subgroups the tribunal found a significant majority of men.
The Court of Appeal upheld the reversal of this decision with
reference to the prior ECJ decision in R v. Secretary of State for
Employment ex parte Seymour-Smith. In this case, the ECJ held that the
legal test for establishing whether a seemingly neutral provision may be
indirectly sex discriminatory only where it has a substantial adverse
disparate effect on one sex as opposed to the other.7' It is insufficient to
merely establish a substantial disparate effect within the disadvantaged
group. The analysis requires a comparison of the measure's effect on the
sexes within the advantaged and the disadvantaged groups, and the
comparison must be followed by an assessment of the disparate impact
on the proportion of men and women in both groups. Applying this test
to the facts before it, the Court of Appeal found that the proper statistical
pool was not the group of those above the statutory age limit together
with the portion of the workforce approaching the limit but the entire
eligible workforce from sixteen to over seventy. Only if a markedly
greater impact on either sex could be established in the context of the
entire workforce could a facially neutral provision be indirectly
discriminatory based on sex. Given the small percentage of those
employed over the age of sixty-five, the marked difference in terms of
the numbers of adversely affected men as opposed to women, almost
receded into statistical insignificance after adding the much more evenly
balanced workforce under fifty-five. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal
dismissed the claim for indirect sex discrimination.
The reasoning of the Court of Appeal is open to criticism on several
grounds. First, the court failed to refer the issue of interpretation of the
Burden of Proof Directive 98/52 on the ground that it was acte clair in
all but name.72 Second, female participation in the workforce declines in
71. Case C-167/97, R. v. Sec'y of State for Employment ex parte Seymour-Smith,
1999 E.C.R. 1-623.
72. The Directive did not come into force until after the ECJ passed judgment in
Seymour-Smith. If, as was argued before the Court of Appeal by counsel for the
claimants, it lowered the burden of proof required to establish an instance of indirect sex
discrimination, it would have raised the issue of whether Seymour-Smith survived as a
precedent. According to Community law, national appellate courts have no power to
affirm or overrule ECJ precedent, and the Court of Appeal should have referred on those
grounds. The Court of Appeal, of course, took the view that the interpretation of the
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rough proportion to the average age of the group under consideration:
the older the workforce, the fewer the number of women employed, and
correspondingly, the larger the proportion of families where the husband
is the sole earner. In these circumstances it might have been more
appropriate to interpret the principle in Seymour-Smith in a more
purposive or flexible fashion so as to limit the size of the relevant
advantaged group to take account for drastically changing employment
patterns. Alternatively, the Court of Appeal should have referred
precisely this issue to the ECJ. At the same time, however, it is arguable
that the material facts in Rutherford were sufficiently similar to those of
Seymour-Smith to justify its treatment as precedent. What is astonishing
is not the application of this precedent in Rutherford, but the later
decision of the court to apply the same precedent to the case of Home
Office v. Bailey & Ors.73
In Bailey, a group of female employees filed a claim for indirect
sexual discrimination against their employer, the Prison Service, alleging
that a substantial number of female executives received less opportunity
for promotion and less pay than males in equivalent levels of
employment. Although there was no single criterion or threshold by
reference to which the workforce could be described either as advantaged
or as disadvantaged, the Court of Appeal nevertheless applied the
Seymour-Smith test, and on the basis that the appropriate pool was the
entire workforce in the Prison Service, held that the disparate pay effect
on both sexes resulting from the discriminatory grade structure was
sufficiently substantial to justify a finding of indirect sex discrimination.
The Court of Appeal's reliance on Seymour-Smith as binding
precedent, however, is highly questionable due to the absence of a clear
criterion distinguishing advantaged from the disadvantaged group.
Without clear distinguishing criterion, the court's assessment of the
grading structure's disparate impact rested on a considerably uncertainty
statistical basis. The court compounded the uncertainty through its
necessary determination of which employment grades were of sufficient
equivalency. Arguably both features which distinguished the factual
scenario in Bailey from that in Seymour-Smith were sufficiently material
so as to cast doubt on the application of the latter case as a binding
precedent. In these circumstances the Court of Appeal should have
referred the question of the materiality of these facts to the ECJ and not
substituted its own view for the Court of Justice's preliminary ruling.
Burden of Proof Directive was acte clair, which, on its proper construction, the Court
held, was entirely consistent with Seymour-Smith-another far from self-evident
conclusion where the Court of Appeal should have deferred to the ECJ. See id.
73. Home Office v. Bailey, [2005] EWCA (Civ) 327.
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Given the obvious differences between both case scenarios, it is difficult
to resist the suspicion that in its perception of a strongly politically
correct climate, the Court of Appeal chose to apply an existing precedent
to novel factual circumstances to achieve a politically desirable result
when legal certainty could have been more effectively advanced by an
authoritative ruling by the ECJ.
Another example of flagrant disregard for well-established ECJ
precedent by the English courts is Gough v. Chief Constable of
Derbyshire.74 In this case both the Divisional Court and the Court of
Appeal ruled that mandatory restrictions on free movement of persons
involved in violence and disorder at football matches was compatible
with Community law without finding that the restriction was necessary
or appropriate to achieve a public policy objective. Indeed, the court
thought the restriction was obviously quite unnecessary and
inappropriate.75 As the Court of Appeal put it, "The UK government
enjoys a wide margin of discretion in the methods it adopts, by way of
primary legislation, to achieve its legitimate objective on a difficult
social policy issue, even when derogating from rights established by the
EC Treaty. 76 The language of deference to the UK Parliament adopted
by the Court of Appeal may have been appropriate in the context of the
European Convention of Human Rights but has no place in relation to
Community law. At the time of the decision, the principle of
proportionality had been well-established as a pervasive principle of
Community law. Thus, although Member States have the right to impose
restrictions on free movement to achieve certain justifiable objectives
under Article 39(3), the Court had made plain in numerous decisions that
such restrictions would be unlawful if they were either not suitable or not
necessary to achieve the desired end or went beyond what is necessary to
the achievement of this end.77 To be lawful, a measure must be for a
justifiable end and meet all three criteria of the proportionality test:
suitability, necessity, and the least restrictive means available to achieve
the end. In Gough, neither the Divisional Court nor the Court of Appeal
addressed the question of proportionality, which is fundamental to the
74. Gough v. Chief Constable of Derbyshire, [2002] Q.B. 1231.
75. It was precisely the purpose of the amendments to the Football Spectators Act
1989 introduced by the Football (Disorder) Act 2000 that restrictions on travel abroad
were to be made mandatory on the basis of purely domestic conduct and without any
finding of a risk of disorder if the individual were permitted to travel abroad. See id. at
1245 (Annex).
76. Id. at 1222.
77. See, e.g., Case 36/75 Rutili v. Ministre de l'Int~rieur, 1975 E.C.R. 1219; Case
33/74 Van Binsbergen v. Beestur, 1974 E.C.R. 1299. For further discussion including




issue of its lawfulness. Both courts chose to ignore relevant ECJ
precedents. The Court of Appeal judgment refers to the proportionality
principle in all but name when considering whether the measure could be
lawful even if not necessary and/or inappropriate. Its conclusion that the
measure could stand even in these circumstances, directly contradicts the
ample Court of Justice case law to the contrary on precisely this point. If
the domestic courts had followed ECJ precedent, as they were obliged to
under the European Communities Act 1972, they would have found
either that the measure was unlawful on the grounds of it either being
unnecessary or inappropriate. Alternatively, they should have referred
the question whether the domestic legislation met the double "necessary
and appropriate" test to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary
ruling. In the event they did neither, and in obfuscating the legal issue in
the case by borrowing the legal concepts of discretion and margin of
appreciation from the ECHR, the Court of Appeal only thinly disguised
the obvious motive for this curious reasoning, namely, to avoid a high
profile clash between Community law rights and Parliamentary
sovereignty. Put at its simplest, the Court of Appeal ignored binding
ECJ precedent and gave effect to a domestic law, which according to
relevant Community case law was clearly unlawful, and following the
Factortame78 ruling, should not have been applied by the domestic court.
As noted by one commentator, Gough is by no means the only
questionable Court of Appeal decision recently made concerning the free
movement provisions of the EC Treaty.79 In International Transport
Roth v. Secretary of State for the Home Department,8 0 the Court of
Appeal was confronted directly with the question of whether a piece of
primary legislation in the immigration field could be challenged as
incompatible with Community law, not because of its impact on
individuals wishing to travel but because of its adverse impact on the
provision of haulage services between the Member States. The
legislation required carriers to perform extensive checks on their vehicles
in order to avoid liability, while also providing for the detention of the
vehicles as security for the discharge of the financial obligations
notwithstanding the fact that such vehicles were used for the provision of
lawful commercial haulage services between the Member States. The
core reasoning of Lord Justice Simon Brown is revealing:
I simply cannot recognise in the present scheme, inconsistent with the
78. Case C-213/89 R v. Sec'y of State for Transp. ex parte Factortame Ltd., 1990
E.C.R. 1-2433.
79. Rhodri Thompson, Community Law and the Limits of Deference, 2005 EuR.
HUM. RTS. L. REv. 242, 243 (2005).
80. Int'l Transp. Roth GmbH v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2003] Q.B. 728.
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Convention though I regard it to be, a restriction under Community
law such as to require justification under the public policy
derogation. To characterise the scheme as unjust and unfair is not to
say that it therefore "impair[s] the very substance of the rights
guaranteed," as the court put it in the Germany case [1994] ECR I-
4973, 5065, para 78. Not every breach of the Convention affecting
cross-border trade and services involves an impermissible restriction
on Treaty rights.
81
There are at least two significant errors in this reasoning. First, the ECJ
has made clear repeatedly that it considers the ECHR to be an integral
part of the legal patrimony of the Community, which forms the
foundation of its legal order, and that it will take heed of the Convention
and the caselaw of the European Court of Human Rights in interpreting
Community law. For this reason it is difficult to follow Lord Justice
Brown LJ's reasoning that a measure-be it national or a Community
rule-may be incompatible with the ECHR jurisprudence but permissible
under Community law. In any event, it would be for the ECJ to decide
this issue. It follows that Lord Justice Brown should have referred
precisely this issue for a preliminary ruling. Secondly, Lord Justice
Browns reasoning seems confused between: (1) when a right is engaged;
and (2) whether an interference with that right can be justified. Lord
Justice Brown suggests that the manifest interference with the haulage
companies' provision of services does not affect any rights under
Community law-a position patently at odds with the existing case law
of the ECJ. The error is clear in the first and last sentences of the above
quotation, where the judgment slides from the concept of "a
restriction... such as to require justification" to "an impermissible
restriction on Treaty rights." The correct position in Community law is
that the degree of interference required by the domestic statute clearly
engaged Community rights, but that the restrictions might be open to
justification on the grounds of public policy, and if the objective were
justifiable, provided that the measure were proportionate to the objective
pursued. Neither Lord Justice Brown nor his two colleagues on the
Court of Appeal panel provided any coherent analysis of the position in
Community law in these terms.
International Transport Roth was part of the sequel to the original
Hoverspeed litigation. In Hoverspeed 82 the essence of the claimant's
case related to a Mr. Castro, a Portuguese national of Angolan birth who
was living in London as a student. While in Calais, Mr. Castro had been
81. Id. at 757.
82. R. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't exparte Hoverspeed, [1999] Eur. L.R.
596 (Q.B.) (hereinafter Hoverspeed 1).
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refused carriage by Hoverspeed and was arrested by the French special
police. He spent a night in a French prison and wasthreatened with
deportation to Angola. The claimants contended that this was a situation
that was grossly incompatible with Community law, and in particular,
incompatible with the procedural protections that were required under
Council Directive 64/221,83 where a Community national is refused entry
into another Member State. Article 8 of that Directive reads:
The person concerned shall have the same legal remedies in respect
of any decision concerning entry, or refusing the issue or renewal of a
residence permit, or ordering expulsion from the territory, as are
available to nationals of the State concerned in respect of acts of the
administration.
84
In a series of cases, the United Kingdom has argued, and the Court of
Justice has accepted, that the relevant standards of procedural protection
are the general rules of judicial review of administrative action.85
However, the Divisional Court in Hoverspeed I again deferred to the UK
legislature, finding that there was no incompatibility between domestic
legislation requiring the security checks by private passenger carriers and
Directive 64/221. The applicable directives, in particular Directive
73/148,86 permitted checks on travel documents at the national
boundaries between Member States, subject to the procedural protections
afforded by Directive 64/221. The court reasoned that it must follow that
the same checks, even if carried out by a private party outside the
territory of the Member State and without any procedural protections,
were also compatible with Community law. 87 Again, the underlying
reasoning of the court was that this was an area where the national court
was required to defer to the decisions of the sovereign legislature: "If
ever there was scope for a significant margin of appreciation in operating
what for present purposes we are assuming to be a restriction, surely it is
here. '' 88  The court's conclusion again reveals a fundamental
misunderstanding of the position under Community law. The aim of
Directive 64/221 was "substantially to reduce the discretionary power of
the States ... by requiring that the individual position of such workers
should be given a thorough examination which is subject to review by
the courts.,, 89 There was thus no question of Member States enjoying
83. Council Directive 64/221, 1964 O.J. (L 56) 85 (EEC).
84. Id. at art. 8.
85. See, e.g., Joined Cases C-65/95 & 111/95, R. v. Sec'y of State for the Home
Dep't exparte Radiom & Shingara [1997] E.C.R. 1-3343.
86. Council Directive 73/148, 1973 O.J. (L 172) 14 (EEC).
87. HoverspeedI, [1999] Eur. L.R. 596 (Q.B.).
88. Id.
89. Opinion of Advocate General Mayras (Feb. 19, 1975) in Case 67/74, Bonsignore
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any legislative discretion over compliance with the procedural safeguards
laid down in the Directive; at best national courts could be said to have
the power to fine tune those standards within the confines of the
parameters already laid down by the Directive and the ECJ. Instead, as
in the cases of Gough and International Transport Roth, the domestic
court muddied the waters by not even addressing the crucial issue of the
position in Community law and by the misleading use of the language of
the "margin of appreciation" which properly belongs to the European
Convention of Human Rights but is prone to misrepresenting the position
in the context of Community law.
C. The Procedural Prerogative
In 1976, the European Court of Justice, in its influential preliminary
rulings in Rewe 9° and Comet,9 1 established three principles applicable
that would apply to those cases where individuals invoke Community
rights before national courts:
(1) It is a matter for Member States to determine the courts, tribunals,
procedures, and remedies available to secure enforcement of directly
effective Community rights;
(2) Those national procedures and remedies must not be less
favourable than those available to similar national rights; and
(3) The national procedures and remedies must not make the
enforcement of Community law impossible in practice.
The importance of these decisions is rarely fully appreciated; in Rewe
and Comet the ECJ laid down the principle that it is for the legal system
of each Member State to determine the procedural conditions, including
time limits and rules of evidence, governing legal proceedings for the
protection and enforcement of directly effective Community law. There
are qualifications to this general principle, notably, national procedures
must be non-discriminatory or prevent the exercise of Community rights.
In practice, however, these minimum conditions have not proved very
onerous, and there are many cases where the English courts have been
able to rely on domestic procedure in moderating the impact of
Community law. Put in the language of Lord Denning's famous words
likening Community law to the incoming tide making its way up the
v. Oberstadtdirektor der Stadt K6ln, 1975 E.C.R. 297, 316.
90. Case 33/76, Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG v. Landwirtschaftskammer fiir das Saarland,
1976 E.C.R. 1989.
91. Case 45/76, Comet v. Produktschap voor Siergewassen, 1976 E.C.R. 2043.
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estuaries and into the remotest riverbeds in the British Isles, 92 it could be
said that national procedural law has functioned as an elaborate system
of water locks and dams that has enabled the many individual lock-
master judges to close the floodgates and stem the tide. National time
limits are perhaps the procedural device with the greatest measurable
effect on the ability of individuals to enforce their rights as they directly
correlate to the number of cases instituted in the courts.
The short time limits in some of the English tribunals have affected
the enforcement of Community law in two ways. First, many rights
individuals may have under Community law are classified in English law
as public law rights and must proceed by judicial review. The time limit
for commencing judicial review proceedings requires that the action be
brought "promptly, and in any event not later than three months after the
grounds to make the claim first arose. 93 This rule gives the courts
almost complete discretion over which cases to allow to proceed and
which to throw out. However, the courts also have discretion to allow
proceedings to be instituted after three months have elapsed. As of yet,
there have been no successful challenges brought in the English courts
against the time limit for judicial review on the ground that the
discretionary time limits governing the enforcement of many rights under
Community law in Britain are in breach of the principle of legal certainty
under Community law.
Second, disputes between employers and employees have been one
of the most litigious areas of law involving Community law. In England,
actions employees bring actions against employers in the employment
tribunals, largely because the losing party typically does not bear the
costs of the other side and because of the court's are perceived as more
employee-friendly and less formal. Claims before employment tribunals,
however, including all claims for unfair dismissal and sex discrimination,
ordinarily have to be brought within three months of the point in time
when the cause of action arose. Ample evidence suggests that, because
of the very strict limitation period, many meritorious employment cases,
including many involving rights under Community law, are never
allowed to be brought.94 Moreover, where Community law and national
employment law partially overlap and where the claimant has first
brought proceedings under national law which were either withdrawn or
dismissed, then, the Court of Appeal has held in Staffordshire CC v.
92. HP Bulmer Ltd. v. J. Bollinger SA, [1974] Ch. 401, 418 (C.A.).
93. CPR pt. 54.5(1) (U.K.), available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/procrulesfin/
menus/rules.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
94. For a full discussion see FRANCIS JACOBS & MADS ADENAS, EUROPEAN
CoMMUNITY LAW IN THE ENGLISH COURTS, 199-208 (1998).
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Barber95 that the principle of issue estoppel would prevent the claimant
from bringing a second set of proceedings on the same facts. Overall,
the minimum standards laid down in the Rewe case have provided no
safeguards for litigants; as long as national procedural rules do not
openly discriminate against rights under Community law, or do not make
it virtually impossible to enforce these rights, the national procedural
prerogative allows national courts to follow a generally restrictive
approach where it would be ultra vires for the ECJ to interfere.
However, national time limits are subject to one major exception.
According to the principle of default, a Member State in default of
implementing a directive cannot rely on its own delay in proceedings
instituted against it to protect the rights intended to be conferred by the
Directive. 96 In practice this principle means that a defaulting Member
State cannot invoke a national time limit to defeat a claim against it. In
Emmott v. Minister of Social Welfare,97 the ECJ established that the time
limit does not begin to run against the claim as long as the Member State
is in default of its obligation fully to implement the Directive.98 The
principle in Emmott, however, only applies to the institution of
proceedings, and not to the institution of an appeal against a decision.
This is the implication of the decision of the Employment Appeal
Tribunal in Setiyah v. East Yorkshire Health Authority,99 which ruled that
no principle of Community law was violated by the application of a
national law rule setting a time limit for appealing. 100 Setiyah is another
case where a domestic tribunal decided to interpret and effectively limit
the scope of an ECJ precedent when it should have deferred and referred
the question. 10  It brings into focus the impact of the principle of
national procedural autonomy on the enforcement of Community law
without even raising the official question of judicial compliance with its
substantive requirements. Through procedural limitations, even the
strongest cases may be lost.
95. Staffordshire CC v. Barber, [1996] I.C.R. 379 (C.A.) (Eng.).




99. Setiyah v. East Yorkshire Health Auth., [1995] I.C.R. 799 (E.A.T.) (Eng.).
100. Id.
101. It can be argued that Emmott has been effectively overruled by the ECJ in Case
C-188/95, Fantask A/S v. Industriministeriert, 1997 E.C.R. 1-6783. Fantask, however,
was referred and decided several years after the domestic case of Setiyah. As the latter




D. Judicial Decisions Between Ignorance and Oversight
Contrary to the received view of the English courts as models of
compliance, it has been shown that the English courts have skilfully used
the uncertainty inherent in the application of ECJ precedent and of the
acte clair doctrine. Matters are made worse by the fact that the
Community legal order does not provide any judicial remedy against
national courts for failure to make references to the ECJ or to apply
binding ECJ precedent. As one notable commentator has shown, judicial
discretion in the absence of effective Community sanction has allowed
domestic political choices by Parliament to prevail over conflicting,
doctrinally superior Community law. 10 2 On other occasions the English
courts effectively imposed their own social and economic policy by
favoring an arguably one-sided approach to sex discrimination or by
invoking floodgates arguments for the sake of protecting the public
purse, all either on the basis of alleged established precedent or under the
guise of actes clairs. In many cases, however, it remains unclear
whether the determining factor of the misapplication of Community law
was deliberate manipulation, wilful disregard, or mere ignorance.
The fact that England has gotten by for centuries with little more
than ten dozen High Court and Court of Appeal justices has long been
one of the enduring mysteries in the eyes of a baffled outside legal world.
Part of the explanation-less well known and perhaps less awe-
inspiring-is the fact that traditionally English judges were not expected
to know the law relevant to the case before them but rather relied on
counsel for the exposition of the pertinent law. Somehow during the
adversarial clash between starkly opposed pictures of the law as it was
argued to apply to the facts, the truth was somehow assumed to break
through and crystallize brightly in the sound judgment of the impartial
judicial spectator. While, over recent decades, there has been a felicitous
trend toward a more informed and interventionist judicial approach, even
today most judges would not have received any formal legal training in
Community law. In the early decades of British membership it was
probably no exaggeration to say that most judges would have been
practically ignorant of Community law. Most barristers, likewise, at
least during the initial period of British membership of the EC, would
have had little or no training in EC law and have been required to "mug
up" the requisite unfamiliar law on a case-by-case basis; nonetheless,
judges would have been almost entirely reliant upon them. In general
terms, the quality of judicial decisions indicates that the situation began
to improve after 1985, shortly before EC law became a compulsory
102. See Thompson, supra note 79.
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subject for all UK law students in the mid-1990s. Even today, however,
the non-specialist training and function of most High Court judges and of
many barristers inevitably means that counsel will fail to cite all the
relevant law, with the judge in no position to correct the oversight. This
applies to Community law no less than any other specialist areas of the
law, and the case of Haracoglou is a case in point.'
0 3
As the facts are stated in the decision, Ms. Haracoglou was the
daughter of Greek nationals born in London. At the age of three her
parents separated and her mother returned to Greece taking her daughter
with her. Haracoglou was educated in Greece until the age of 18, and
then returned to the UK to complete a three year law degree at University
College London. Later, she was accepted for a course at the European
University Institute (EUI) and applied to the Department for Education
and Skills (DfES) for support. Regulation 4 of the Education (Student
Support) (European Institutions) Regulations 2000 ("the regulations")
provided that a person shall be eligible for support in connection with
attendance at a designated course if a number of conditions are satisfied.
Haracoglou's course at the EUI was a designated course. Regulation 4(a)
required eligibility under paragraph 8 of schedule 1 to the regulations.
Paragraph 8(c) provided that a person was eligible for support if her
residence in the UK "has not during any part of the period referred to in
subparagraph (b) been wholly or mainly for the purpose of receiving full-
time education." The period referred to in subparagraph (b) was the
period of three years preceding the first day of the first academic year of
the course. It was conceded that Haracoglou was ordinarily resident
during that three-year period. The principal issue was whether
Haracoglou 's residence had "been wholly or mainly for the purpose of
receiving full time education." On these facts, the DES took the view
that Haracoglou had returned to the UK and had been a resident in the
UK during the three relevant years "wholly or mainly for the purpose of
receiving full-time education." Haracoglou denied that her residence in
the UK was wholly or mainly for the purposes of education, and sought
judicial review of the decision on the application for funding for student
support. 1
04
Justice Hooper accepted her argument and ordered the DES to fund
her course at the EUI on the ground that Haracoglou, although living
abroad until the age of eighteen and having entered this country two
months before the commencement of her course at University College
London and proposing to leave it a few months after completing her full-
103. The Queen on the Application of Harcoglou v. Dep't of Educ. & Skills, [2001]




time degree to continue her studies elsewhere, had not been resident in
Britain for those three years spent in full-time study either wholly or
mainly for the purposes of education. Instead, he accepted her argument
that while she may have spent the three relevant years studying, those
studies were merely a necessary means to her end of becoming a
practicing lawyer in the UK. Hence her residence in Britain had been
devoted almost exclusively to the pursuit of a university degree had not
in reality been for the purpose of studying law, but solely for practicing
it-a distinction whose logic was not lost on Hooper. If either counsel
had drawn Justice Hooper's attention to the fact that the domestic
regulations gave effect to a directly effective EC directive and that the
former had to be interpreted in the light of the latter, even Justice Hooper
might have been estopped from ruling as he did.
The traditional reliance by the English judiciary on counsel for both
parties to refer to all the relevant law constitutes a formidable and almost
ineliminable institutional obstacle to the faithful application of any
relatively unfamiliar or specialist area of law. Often this means that a
judge who has very little expert knowledge of Community law is
instructed on the matter by two or more counsel none of whom may be a
Community law specialist. There now are a small number of three of
four sets of barristers' chambers with EC law expertise at the English
Bar, but because of the pervasive nature of Community law many cases
involving both common law as well as EC legal points are still argued by
traditional generalist or common law barristers. Therefore, all too often
the blind are still being lead by the visually impaired. °5
Hoverspeed I provides a telling example of the abiding self-
confidence of the common law judge in his ability, all too often blissfully
unencumbered by knowledge, to decide any Community law in question.
In the case none of the three Court of Appeal judges provided any
coherent analysis of the Community law position. However, Lord
Justice Jonathan Parker came up with an absolute gem when he repeated
the unfortunate erroneous formula from an earlier Court of Appeal
105. For a few good examples, see FRANcIs JACOBS & MADS ADENAS, supra note 94.
One recent high profile example mentioned is the case of R. v. Ministry of Defence ex
parte Smith, (1996) 2 W.L.R. 305. One of the issues in the case was whether the
discharge of the applicants on the ground that they were of homosexual orientation
amounted to a breach of the Equal Treatment Directive 76/207. The Court of Appeal
held that this was not a breach of the directive, but its judgment was called into question
almost immediately by the publication of the Advocate-General's Opinion in the ECJ
case of P v S. The Opinion had been published and received considerable attention by
EU lawyers by the time the House of Lords Appeal Committee considered the petition to
appeal against the Court of Appeal's decision in ex parte Smith. The Appeal Committee
included Lord Slynn, a former judge of the ECJ. It refused leave to appeal. The
Advocate-General's Opinion in P v S was not referred to by the parties nor in the decision
of the highest court of the land. See JACOBS & ADENAS, supra note 94 at 143-44.
20061
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
case, 10 6 that "frontier controls have 'nothing to do with Article [49].
' ' 1 °7
This is not only flatly inconsistent with the terms of the Community
directives governing this area, 10 8 but it is also inconsistent with a whole
series of cases where the European Court of Justice has considered this
issue, such as Wijsenbeek. 109 The "veil of ignorance" from behind which
the English courts still decide many points of Community law, led one
leading practitioner to summarize the situation in these terms: "On the
whole the English courts apply EC law with the utmost good faith though
not always with much depth of knowledge."11 The above cases suggest
that, while the former may be questioned, the latter is beyond dispute.
E. Cost and Delay
Victory in the courtroom means not only losers but even the victors
are undone, especially when winning comes at great cost and delay.
Considerable expense and delay are associated with litigation in all legal
systems, except perhaps for court martial trials where both are reduced at
the expense of justice. Yet, it seems that, on average and across almost
all areas of law, the cost of litigation in the English common law system
exceeds that in any Continental jurisdiction. For example, the average
cost of high value litigation in the English High Court is between two-
and-a-half and three times the cost of an equivalent action in Germany.'11
The reasons are obvious: higher legal fees, the duplication of effort and
expenditure arising from the division into barristers and solicitors, more
extensive disclosure and due diligence requirements, the adversarial
system with its emphasis on lengthy direct examinations and even
lengthier cross-examinations, and as a result of extensive disclosure, the
tendency of many lawyers to hide potentially damaging information by
burying it deep within innumerable files of irrelevant documentation.
None of these is an exclusive feature of the common law system but
106. R. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, ex parte Flynn, (1995)139 Sol. J. 196
(C.A.) (Eng.).
107. Hoverspeed I, [1999] Eur. L.R. 596 (Q.B.), 202.
108. See, e.g., Council Directive 73/148, 1973 O.J. (L 172) 14 (EEC); Council
Directive 64/221, 1963-1964 O.J. SPEC ED. 117 (EEC).
109. See Case C-378-97, Criminal Proceedings against Wijsenbeek, 1999 E.C.R. I-
6207, 45. (finding Member State's requirement to show passport upon entry engaged
the right of free movement).
110. Private e-mail to Dr. Gunnar Beck (Aug. 23, 2005) (on file with author).
111. PENNY DARBYSHIRE, DARBYSHIRE ON THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 245 (2005).
Penny Darbyshire in her most recent edition of her textbook on the English legal system
cites estimates according to which a high value day case in the High Court would involve
court fees alone of around £6,100 in England compared with only £2,300 in Germany.
The discrepancy in lawyers' fees involved in High Court litigation in English courts and
those in other jurisdictions outside the United State and certain Commonwealth
jurisdictions is broadly similar. Id.
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taken together, they are more characteristic of litigation and court
proceedings in England than elsewhere in Europe. To the extent to
which the cost of litigation is higher in the English courts than elsewhere
in the Community, the higher costs act as a deterrent which, ceteris
paribus, makes it less likely that individuals will seek redress through the
courts. Given that EC law is a specialist practice area where most of the
advice is given by medium-sized to very large commercial law firms, this
is likely to apply to the enforcement of individual rights under EC law
just as much as to any other area of litigation. Similar to the U.S., higher
litigation costs have not prevented the UK from becoming a more
litigious society. While Community law is not necessarily less
frequently litigated in the UK courts, the higher cost of doing so certainly
raises the stakes.
Delay is a further deterrent for citizens seeking to enforce their
rights through the courts. Between 1987 and 1992, the average delay in
dispatching a reference to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling from the
moment the order was drawn up was almost three months and often
significantly longer in individual cases. There is no comparable set of
data for the period from 1993 to the present but practitioners interviewed
by the author suggest that, if anything, there might have been an
increase. In extremis, the entirely avoidable administrative delay by the
English courts can add up to fifty percent to the average two years it
currently takes the ECJ to give a preliminary ruling.
IV. Conclusion
Section 2 of the 1972 Act requires the English courts to perform not
only their traditional role as the domestic courts of the United Kingdom
but also their novel role as the UK courts of the European Union. The
belief is that the UK courts have been exemplary in discharging their
new function and faithfully applied Community law throughout the three
decades of British membership, often in the face of considerable political
opposition and euro-sceptic public sentiment. The above discussion
suggests a more nuanced and complicated picture. It is best described as
a contrast between the high profile theoretical layer of official acceptance
and the practical layer of day-to-day judicial decision-making where
judges are largely free from the constraints of political and public
scrutiny and loyal cooperation with the ECJ has been far from uniform.
From the first perspective, the standard view of the English courts
as models of compliance seems largely uncontested. This is true
particularly in relation to the high profile issues of the supremacy and
direct effect of Community law, where the domestic courts have
scrupulously implemented their mandate under the 1972 Act, and aligned
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legislation with Community law wherever possible while giving primacy
to EC law in cases of conflict. In one sense, the structure of the English
legal and judicial system facilitated acceptance of the doctrines of
supremacy and direct effect. The absence of a written constitution left
the courts free from the constraints of a superior national legal code,
which in other member states, acts as a side-constraint on parliamentary
legislation, including decisions to delegate such powers to a supra-
national organization thereby preventing national constitutional courts
from, accepting the unconditional supremacy of Community law. In
Britain, by contrast, absence of such a higher national law means that the
House of Lords could simply not apply national legislation that is
irreconcilable with Community law. In this sense, judicial discretion has
favored the implementation of Community law in Britain.
Inevitably, discretion will always facilitate and not hinder its
implementation. First, in spite of persistent euro-scepticism there is no
doubt that the government wanted to fulfil Britain's obligations under the
EC Treaty. Had the courts refused to discharge their vital role in
enforcing compliance, this would have led them into conflict with the
political authorities. It is even arguable that, in implementing unpopular
EC legislation and ECJ case law, the courts provided governments with a
convenient excuse, in some cases, for adopting a measure when its
enactment through the domestic legislative machinery would have been
politically undesirable. Second, judicial discretion has not merely
facilitated the application of EC law but the application of EC law has
itself favored the judicialization of legislation in the UK. Judges, thus,
had good reason to welcome their novel function as Community law
enforcers for it strengthened their hand vis-A-vis the domestic legislature,
which has become obvious in the strongly purposive reading adopted by
the Courts when interpreting statutes with a view to their compliance
with the Human Rights Act 1998.
Third, like the exercise of all judicial power which rests on political
acquiescence, the broadly loyal attitude shown by the domestic courts in
discharging their less familiar role as the UK courts of the European
Community, is conditional on the persistence of a political climate where
British membership in the EC is not seriously questioned. If that climate
were to change, then it remains to be seen whether a judiciary, which
because of its legal training and outlook, cannot be assumed to be
naturally integrationist, will resist the temptation of watering down
Community legislation and case law by liberal use of its largely
unchecked powers under the acte clair doctrine as well as its frequently
highly restrictive and narrow reading of existing ECJ precedent. The
present Community legal system fails to provide any real safeguards or
remedies. The Community legal system remains dependent on the
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cooperation of national judiciaries, and judges are likely to cooperate
only in a broadly sympathetic political climate. If the political
parameters change, so are judicial attitudes and opinions. In that sense,
F.A. Hayek was right: the very considerable discretion enjoyed by
common law judges both tends to record and translate into law changing
social and political views, and it does so first and foremost because
judges know that their power is conditional on not overstepping certain
parameters of political acquiescence.' 
1 2
In summary, the official view, as it may be called, of the English
courts as a model for national courts of the European Union is not so
much wrong as it is misleading. It represents a highly incomplete picture
premised almost exclusively on the relative ease with which the highest
English courts absorbed the doctrines of supremacy and direct effect-a
fact almost wholly explicable in terms of the absence of a written
constitution in the UK. In other Member States, by contrast, it has been
precisely the non-negotiable domestic status of the national constitution
which has infused judicial debates about the limits of the primacy of
Community law. In Britain where such debates were more easily
resolved, the implementation of Community law is itself conditional on
the traditional model of parliamentary supremacy. If Parliament were to
legislate in open defiance of Community law, the English courts would
be placed in a position where they would have to choose between
Parliamentary and Community legal supremacy. As in other Member
States, however, such conflict has so far been carefully avoided.
The concepts of supremacy and direct effect may have been largely
accepted but they remain largely theoretical concepts, to be applied in
practice to recalcitrant facts, shifting evidential patters to be evaluated in
accordance with elaborate national procedures and with reference to
problematic precedents and les actes ni clairs ni vidents. It from this,
the second perspective which tries to cut through the thickets of everyday
judicial decisions to the reality of the cooperation between national
courts and ECJ, and not at the high profile level of official compliance
that the English courts have been to able to bring to bear their powers of
discretion on the implementation of Community law on its long way
through the national courts. In the common law tradition judicial power
is exercised mainly through the interpretation of legal texts and the
central concepts they contain and the distinction, widening and
manipulation of precedents that may be doctrinally immutable but
practically far from determinate in new factual scenarios. The above
examples suggest that in the context of the implementation of
Community law the exercise of judicial power has made itself felt via
112. See PETSOULAS, supra note 1.
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three principal avenues. First, though the careful distinction, further
abstraction or extension by analogy of ECJ precedents and relevant
domestic cases the courts have skilfully adjusted the domestic
implementation of Community law to their own preferred interpretations
and political choices. Conversely, the doctrine of acte clair has provided
the domestic courts with a second major avenue to bring about the same
result: by deciding for themselves Community law points which, neither
clear nor yet decided, they should have referred to the Court of Justice.
Thirdly, Community law has conferred on national courts almost
complete procedural control over the application of EC law in the
national courts, which is practically the only route open to private
litigants seeking to enforce their rights.
Like so much of the law in general, court procedure enjoys almost
complete protection against public and press criticism because of its
distinct mixture of great technicality and relentless tedium. Thus hidden
from wider scrutiny, the impact of the national procedural prerogative
has made itself felt across the whole spectrum of Community law
litigation in the English courts. The above discussion does not suggest
that the subversion of Community law by the English judiciary has been
comprehensive, systematic and wholly intentional. Yet, it does call into
question the received view of domestic compliance as near universal, in
utmost good faith and with requisite competence. At no point so far has
non-compliance seriously threatened the enforcement of Community law
throughout the United Kingdom, but its persistence over a period of over
thirty years-be it due to abiding ignorance or the result of deliberate
domestic fine tuning or probably as result of both-might well in
retrospect be judged an ominous pointer, if ever the English courts were
asked to choose between their present potentially conflicting loyalties as
the executors of (or true masters over) legislative will and the domestic
agents of a supranational judicial structure. While there is much that this
article has been designed to call into question, it does at least give a clear
implied answer to the question of how the English courts would respond
to such a situation now or for the foreseeable future.
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